Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Mon.* = *Philosophische Monatshefte; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action. A. F. SHAND. Mind, No. 16, pp. 450–471.

The principal inferences which can be based on the fact of involuntary action may be summarized as follows. That which makes an action *in*voluntary as distinguished from one merely *non*-voluntary, is the presence of a volition opposed to it. This volition is abortive: we will to realize one idea and fail; but we realize a counter-idea which we opposed. This abortive volition is more than attention to an idea with desire and effort, and contains a distinctive event,—the exclusive identification of ourselves with one idea. This identification is specific, and cannot be resolved into the assimilation of one idea by a body of thought and tendency, which we find in all thought. This identification, this event Will, regarded in its quality or character, is a unique differentiation of conative thought. This event, like all other events, is active, and modifies the psychosis into which it enters.—It is evident from this analysis of involuntary action that it cannot be maintained that realization of the idea is essential to volition. In involuntary action the fundamental character is that the idea we will to realize does *not* produce its existence. It might seem strange that realization of an idea ever came to be maintained as essential to volition, if we did not remember that otherwise, on the common theory, the distinction between thought and will is lost. The analysis of involuntary action also enables us to settle another question. Though many practical people have a strong conviction that the will does not always follow the strongest motive, psychologists have felt that in order to give any scientific account of the Will, they must assume that it always does. Professor James indeed says that "in all hard cases of volition" we feel as if the line taken were that of greater resistance, but he has not ventured to express more than this surmise. But, in involuntary action, we have no mere surmise that the will sometimes follows the weaker motive, but evidence apparently so strong that we can only draw one conclusion from it. It is, of course, very difficult to find any method for estimating the strength of opposite motives, but, taking everything into account, it may reasonably be inferred that the intense effort sometimes felt when there is a counter-idea present, is due mainly to the superior strength of that idea over the other. — Will, therefore, must be regarded as possessing a unique quality of its own. It is that decisive event which must occur in a process of thought or attention to ideas, before the latter can become volition in any sense that will enable us to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action. Just as in comparing visual and auditory sensations we see that each has developed a special quality of its own, so when we compare Will with Thought and Feeling, or with the lower conative developments, we find in it too a unique quality which cannot be analyzed into others.

DAVID IRONS.

Psychologie du nominalisme. L. DUGAS. Rev. de Mét., III, 6, pp. 645–672.

Generality can be predicated only of a form of activity, not of ideas or things. The perception of an object is a definite act. Just in so far as a series of such acts involves the same form of activity, a habit or tendency to that *kind* of activity is established. This habit as such cannot be ideated. An idea is a habit determined to a particular act. Hence there are no 'general ideas.' *An* idea must be a determinate act, and so particular. The only generality lies in the *habitude* viewed as the possibility of any or any number, indifferently, of a series of perceptive acts. Generality is, then, at bottom, a predicate of the will rather than of the intellect. Thought is limited activity. The different series of acts constituting the different habits or lines of activity are determined by the different organs receiving stimuli. Thus again the general may be defined as 'the identical *manner* in which reactions against impressions occur.' If at every stimulation the habitude were completely determined, all the acts in the series would be reproduced. But what is wanted in thinking, that is, in getting at the relations between these lines of mental movement, is not the whole series of particular acts, but merely the kind or form of activity involved. Hence the need of a symbol to stand for the form involved in the series as a whole. This symbolizing is the function of language. The word thus becomes the stimulus, not for a series of particular acts, but for an attitude of mind. There is, then, more justification for the nominalists' view that universality resides only in words, than for the conceptualists' contention that it resides only in ideas. For universality is in the word functionally, while it is in no sense in the idea. In fact, both are wrong, the real seat of universality being in the movement, the form of the activity which the language symbolizes. The freer the habit becomes, the less definite are the images stimulated by the symbol. The value of the activity is felt immediately through the symbol. Hence the more abstract and general knowledge becomes, the more truly may we say that it is only language well constructed, if we understand by 'language,' not something outside thought, but the concentrated form of thought.

A. W. MOORE.

The Confusion of Function and Content in Mental Analysis.
D. S. MILLER. Psych. Rev., II, 6, pp. 535–550.

Function and content are two different aspects of mental phenomena, though the distinction between them is too commonly obscured. The confusion referred to consists in supposing that mental causes, unlike physical, must themselves be an index, by the internal evidence they offer, of the train of consequences they entail; that their function must be wholly determined by their content, and that accordingly their content is a sufficient key to their function. This confusion can be brought out most clearly by examination of a series of cases. (1) In the case of generic ideas what we have in our minds is a perfectly concrete, though a more or less blurred and shifting, vision. In addition to this image, however, there is the tendency of this mental state, by its associations, to prompt the right action towards the members of the class, and inhibit any false thoughts about them. The importance of these forms of consciousness does not depend upon any inner significance they may possess, but upon what they bring after them in the mental train. (2) A probable theory of belief is that it is occasioned by a spontaneous, and not by an indissoluble, association of ideas. If this theory be accepted, it shows that it is not the presentation of ideas which is of importance in the production of belief, but their behavior after they are presented, that is, their influence in preserving each other in firm association. (3) When I try to think of 'nothing,' in a room, *e.g.*, I picture to myself the room, and continually keep excluding the image of any object in the room that may come before my mind. Here it is the maintenance of my idea and the inhibition of all other ideas — in short, the *function* and not the *content* of ideas — that enables me to think of nothing. (4) It is the function of our sense-perceptions to stand for certain objective facts, and in such a way as to guide our action in reference to them. But these perceptions do not have *in themselves* a conscious intent to represent the objective facts. If such were the case, function and content would be inseparable. As it is, the confusion of these two points of view leads to the conclusion that state of consciousness and mental object, idea and content, are different.

G. A. COGSWELL.

On Dreaming of the Dead. HAVELOCK ELLIS. Psych. Rev., II, 5, pp. 458–461.

There are instances of dreams in which the dead are seen as alive. This dream-type may be accounted for as follows. The death of a friend sets up a barrier which cuts into two the stream of impressions concerning him. To effect a harmony between the images representing him as dead and those representing him as alive, the dream-consciousness produces the theory that the person has come to life. If these dreams have an organic foundation which causes them to occur with some degree of frequency, they may in primitive times have played an important part in evolving the belief that death is only a transitory and apparent phenomenon.

I. M. BENTLEY.

Les phénomènes élémentaires de la vie. F. DANTEC. Rev. Ph., XX, 8, pp. 113–153.

The two phenomena here considered are the two that are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of all life, namely, *addition* and *assimilation.* The term 'addition' covers all processes that introduce new material into the protoplasm. As observed in unicellular animals, the process is wholly under the control of mechanical forces. All the intra-protoplasmic actions of the protozoa could take place without any nucleus in the cell, if one supposes that in some way the composition of the protoplasm is kept constant. But addition changes the composition of the protoplasm. All the processes which dispose of new material so as to maintain the composition of the protoplasm constant within certain limits, are included under the term 'assimilation.' The studies of Balbiani, Hofer, and Verworn confirm M. Dantec in his conclusion that assimilation takes place only when there is a nucleus present in the protoplasm. The relation of the assimilative process to the nucleus remains a mystery. Yet the question is worthy of investigation, for it is the true vital phenomenon upon which all other vital processes depend.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

Sur l'origine sensorielle des notions mécaniques. CLÉMENTITCH DE ENGELMEYER. Rev. Ph., XX, 5, pp. 511–517.

Students very quickly form a notion of Velocity, but the distinction between Force and Work presents great difficulty. Reflection upon this anomaly suggests a problem for physiological psychology. What part is played by sight, touch, and the muscular sense, respectively, in our knowledge of motion, of force, and of mechanical work? Sight tells us nothing concerning either force or work ; it enables us to perceive the quantity and direction of motion. Touch gives us the notion of pressure, rarely that of motion also. The muscular sense fails to distinguish between motion and work, between work and force, thus giving rise to a confusion between these ideas. It acts towards these phenomena as if they were of the same order, differing in intensity only. The teacher of mechanics should begin with the notions most familiar and most evident to the beginner. Physiological psychology should inform us what these notions are.

D. R. MAJOR.

Reaction Time with reference to Race. R. M. BACHE. Psych. Rev., II, 5, pp. 475–486.

Spencer calls attention to the contrast between the savage and the civilized man in that the former is so much more than the latter a creature of secondary reflex movements. If, for example, a savage hurts his foot against a stone, he will in all probability immediately kick the stone. This fact can be accounted for, on the ground that the automatic preceded the intellectual condition of man, and that with the disappearance of the primitive conditions of life secondary reflexes became less and less necessary for self-preservation. The savage ought then to have quicker reflex action than civilized man. In support of this conclusion the reaction-time of 12 Whites, 11 Indians, and 11 Africans is given, for auditory, visual, and electric stimulation. The average time for Indians and for Africans is found to be much shorter than for Whites.

I. M. BENTLEY.

Emotion, Desire, and Interest: Descriptive. S. F. M'LENNAN. Psych. Rev., II, 5, pp. 462–474.

In analyzing concrete emotional experiences we find it difficult to say at first, whether we are dealing with emotion, desire, or a fact of interest. If we examine such states as 'love' and 'hatred,' we shall find all three involved. There is a primary interest, then emotion with desire, and, when desire is realized, interest again. Interest is thus at the beginning and end of both emotion and desire. Analyzing more closely emotion and desire, we find that each involves (1) an intellectual element, (2) an attitude towards or against the stimulus, (3) the swell or drive of feeling, (4) pleasure and pain coloring. In the nature of emotion there is inner strife and yet unity, a lack of equilibrium and a seeking for harmony. When the conflicting elements are finally harmonized and we know what we are going to do, the state passes over into volition. If present action is inhibited, desire or preparedness for action ensues. This 'preparedness' does not 'set' immediately, however, and any new suggestion may bring about the old turmoil. Until the desire is 'set' it may pass back into emotion. When inhibition is removed and the 'set' reaction pours forth, we have deepest interest.

I. M. BENTLEY.

ETHICS.

Social Evolution. DAVID G. RITCHIE. Int. J. E., VI, 2, pp. 165–181.

The phrase 'social evolution,' as generally used, implies the assumption that biological conceptions throw *some* light on social phenomena; it generally implies also that without biological theories and conceptions social phenomena cannot be properly studied, nor social problems scientifically dealt with. It is worth while to consider, however, what light biological theories of evolution throw upon the history and the practical problems of human society. The greater complexity of social life among human beings, as compared with what one finds among plants and animals, even social animals, may well suggest that biological conceptions cannot, without considerable modification, be applied to social phenomena. Biological conceptions are certainly less inadequate than mathematical, physical, or chemical conceptions; but an uncritical use of them in this connection involves a constant risk of mistaking metaphors for scientific laws. The applicability of the idea of *natural selection* to human society may be taken as an illustration. The question for the biologist is: What other factors than natural selection, if any, are there in organic evolution? The question for the sociologist is more complicated; for he must not assume without proof that there are no other factors in social than in organic evolution, nor that natural selection means exactly the same thing in human society that it does among plants and animals. For example, in subhuman evolution, races and individuals that have injurious customs perish by natural selection; but in human evolution, where there is consciousness and reflection, the injurious custom may be changed without the extinction of the race or individual that practises it. The natural results of natural selection are continually checked in human society. Thus the theory of natural selection, when applied to human society, sets a problem, but does not solve it. Take, for example, the case of religion. 'Religion exists everywhere among human beings; therefore it must be due to natural selection; therefore its essence is to further social utility.' Thus reasons Mr. Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution*. But what is a 'religion' in Mr. Kidd's sense of the term? One of the problems which most puzzles the student of human history is presented by the apparently anti-social and injurious elements contained in so many of the religions of the world. This very matter has been urged as an objection to the applicability of the theory of natural selection to the explanation of social phenomena. There can be no doubt that 'in primitive conditions of society' religion is the strongest bond of social cohesion; but it is certainly not the sole bond between human beings; nor is a conservative force necessarily under all circumstances beneficial. Again, mere increase in numbers does not always mean 'social progress,' nor decrease, 'national decay,' as biological sociologists are apt to suppose.

D. R. MAJOR.

The Conscience: Its Nature and Origin. WILLIAM W. CARLILE. Int. J. E., VI, 1, pp. 63-77.

Kant's most conspicuous service to ethical science consists in his having secured practically universal recognition of the fact, that any satisfactory theory of the nature and origin of conscience must account for the absence of all considerations of personal consequences, in this world or the next, in action that can claim the sense of duty as its motive. Opposed to this view, however, is the theory of Spencer, that our current conceptions of duty are the result of the experience of past generations with reference to rewards and punishments. But this latter theory wrongly postulates the validity of the method of chemistry in the explanation of psychological metamorphoses. Rather must the method of verification, as used in physics, be applied. An explanation that postulates a metamorphosis in which the new product has nothing in common with the old, is, in psychology, simply equivalent to no explanation at all. But, if we grant that as to its origin Conscience is ultimate and unanalyzable, the question as to its nature still remains. Is it a special sense, the Moral Sense, or must it be regarded under the category of Reason? Clearly the latter view must be accepted. But, if we regard it as Reason pure and simple, we are viewing it as a lever without a fulcrum. Reason aids us to determine what is just and unjust, but assuredly it does not give justice and injustice their meaning. Whence then this meaning? As the child gets his first conception of truth and untruth when he sees them in the concrete and in contrast, so also he gets his first conception of justice and injustice when he meets them in experience. He learns to apply to himself what he first sees in others. The sense of justice is resentment become impersonal. There is no thought of consequences in our indignation at wrong done to another. As the explanation of the prohibitive aspect of the Conscience is to be found in the transformation of resentment, so the explanation of its positive aspect, of the approval that we accord to virtue, is to be found in the transformation of gratitude. The criterion of the good, as well as of the true, is, in the last resort, the concurrent opinion of others. The principle of the 'parity of reasoning' holds in ethical as in speculative thought.

J. F. BROWN.

METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL.

The Hegemony of Science and Philosophy. ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Int. J. E., VI, 2, pp. 137–164.

This article consists of three parts. The first deals with the conflict between those who boast the achievements of Science, and those who insist that scientific methods are inapplicable in certain departments of reality. Philosophy alone, it is claimed, can put an end to the strife. In the second part an effort is made to state the mutual relations of Science and Philosophy; also, to show the attitude of each to reality. "Science concerns itself with the mutual relation of objects, considered independently of their relation (1) to a sentient and thinking subject, (2) to the whole of existence. Science undertakes to determine the objective relations of phenomena, while it eliminates as much as possible the consciousness for which they exist and through which they are known. Such a point of view is partial and abstract, since it does not embrace the whole of reality. After abstracting the thinking subject, pure sciences abstract still further all objects other than the one which is to be considered. Philosophy corrects the abstraction which has been made of the thinking subject, reëstablishes the unity of nature and of thought." The third part treats of the place of 'faith' or 'belief' in practical life. It contains, also, a discussion of the relations of science, religion, and philosophy.

D. R. MAJOR.

L'espace et la géométrie. H. POINCARÉ. Rev. de Mét., III, 6, pp. 631–646.

Representative space in its triple form — visual, tactile, and motor — is essentially different from geometrical space. The latter is continuous, infinite, tri-dimensional, and homogeneous, that is, all its points are of identical value in it. Pure visual space has only two dimensions, is limited, not continuous, not homogeneous. Tactile space is still more complex and further removed from geometrical space. Motor space is not homogeneous, and has *potentially* as many dimensions as there are nerve fibres reporting external objects. This number is *actually* reduced, by neglecting certain of these reports, finding by experience that they agree, sufficiently for practical purposes, with certain others. But this reduction is not an *a priori* form imposed necessarily upon our sensibility. It is wholly a matter of expediency. But are not all objects represented in geometrical space? No, but we may reason about them as if they were. 'Localizing' an object in space means representing the movements necessary to reach it. What then is the significance of geometrical space? Phenomena are (1) Involuntary — not accompanied by muscular sensations and so attributed to external objects, or (2) Voluntary — accompanied by muscular sensations and attributed to our own body. Among the changes in (1) are *some* which can be 'corrected' by correlative changes in (2). The laws of this process of correction constitute the Science of Geometry. Such correction is only possible in the case of solid bodies. Geometry deals therefore with only one particular phase of space experience in general, *viz.*, adjustments involving solidity. Were there no solids in nature there would be no Geometry. The three dimensions of geometrical space are due to the fact that we happen to be constituted as we are, and happen to live in this particular kind of world. In a different world and for a different self, space might have fewer or more dimensions. Finally, though experience plays so large a part in geometry, the latter is not an experiential science, for it is occupied not with actual but with ideal solids.

A. W. MOORE.

The Origin of a 'Thing' and its Nature. J. MARK BALDWIN. Psych. Rev., II, 6, pp. 551-573.

The author's conclusions may be summed up as follows. (1) All statements of the nature of a 'thing' are, for the most part, statements of origin. (2) Statements of origin, however, never exhaust the reality of a thing, since they cannot be true to the experiences which they state unless they construe the reality, not only as a thing which has had a career, but also as one which is about to have a career; for the expectation of the future career rests upon the same historical series as the belief in the past career. (3) All attempts to rule out prospective organization or teleology from the world would be fatal to natural science, and also to the historical interpretation of the world found in the evolution hypothesis; for the category of teleology is but the prospective reading of the same series which, when read retrospectively, we call evolution. (4) The fact that a thing, and more especially mental products, ideas, intuitions, etc., have a natural history, is no argument against their validity or worth as having application beyond the details of their own history; since, if this were so, a natural history series could produce nothing new. (5) All these points may be held together in a view which gives each mental content a twofold value in the active life. Each such content begets two attitudes, by its function as a genetic factor in the progressive development of the individual. As far as it fulfils earlier habits, it begets and confirms the historical or retrospective attitude; as far as it is not entirely exhausted in the channels of habit, so far it begets the expectant or progressive attitude. (6) All organization in the world rests ultimately on the basis of an unconscious convention of our organisms, made during the growth of our experience. The category of causation, *e.g.*, has come to be applied to reality through a continual selecting out, from the mass of events, of those which have exhibited the more definite and invariable aspects of behavior. This category, however, is not capable of universal application, since it fails to explain the origin of that very selective activity on the basis of which it has arisen. (7) Both the naturalist and the intuitionist define 'nature' in terms of 'origin.' At any point in the career of a thing, the former can describe *what* the thing is, only by tracing its career further back; while the latter naturally interprets the nature of the First Cause in the light of mental behavior. The true way of regarding the nature of a thing is to view it, at any given stage of its career, both retrospectively and prospectively — in the latter case as promising a widened sphere of action. (8) In order to explain the category of potentiality a new refinement must be introduced. When we speak of the potency that exists in the behavior of a thing, we have a general expectation of a further career for the thing, but always under the condition that when it shall have reached any point in its future career it can then be interpreted in terms of retrospection. G. A. COGSWELL.

Organic Evolution and Mental Elaboration. HUBERT M. FOSTON. Mind, No. 16, pp. 472–488.

To regard man as a microcosm, as containing in himself a copy of the universe in all its essential aspects, is a characteristic of philosophical thought especially in modern times. The aim of this article is to trace the correspondence between mental life in its three stages of Perception, Imagination, and Conception or Reason, on the one hand, and organic life in its three stages of Vegetable life, Animal life, and Social life, on the other. The analogy between perceptions and plants is seen in the fact that both show, in the early stages of their development, evidence of differentiation and integration,— the former showing an evolution from an original "sensation-continuum," and the latter exhibiting a progressive advance from a primary "hypothetical simple tissue." Both perceptions and vegetables are also subject to the law of the 'survival of the fittest.' In the next stage of development, both animals and images show an advance over the preceding stage in the fact that they are less dependent on their environment, are not so much subject to the *here* and the *now*. The after-memory image, on the one side, and reflex action, on the other, form the transition between the first and the second of these stages. Interest begins to reveal itself in the case of the representative images, and purpose, in the conscious life of animals. The formation of the generic image, by which a number of like images are fused into one, and the possibility of their preservation thus secured, corresponds to the joining together of a number of scattered members into a flock or herd, by which the destruction of these individuals is prevented. The growth of class-marks in the mind, by which the over-specialization of separate ideas is prevented, has its counterpart in the growth of custom in early human societies. Language, as the expression and preservation of a distinct mutual connection between things, has its parallel in a system of positive institutions in the tribal group. Finally, as society fulfils its function better, the more it allows liberty to the individual to develop his own capacities, so in reason there are a variety of aspects of individual objects which must be recognized, if reason is to have an effective application to things as they are. The condition of positive intellectual progress is the patience to let an object form its own true character in our minds, and what we here call 'patience' is called 'tolerance' in society. G. A. COGSWELL.

HISTORICAL.

Gedächtniss-theoretische Untersuchungen und mnemotechnische Spielereien im Altertum. BERGEMANN. A. f. G. d. Ph., VIII, 4, pp. 484–497.

Scientific psychology made no progress amongst the Greeks after Aristotle. There was no longer any originality in Greek intellectual life, and scholars began to sift, collect, and acquaint themselves with the mass of science and literature already produced. Of these scholars there were some who were impelled by a speculative interest, others by a practical interest. To the former class belong the Stoics, Epicureans, and Neo-Platonists, and to the latter, physicians, orators, and teachers of oratory. Amongst the former, only the Neo-Platonists have done anything of importance. Plotinus (205–270 A.D.), in opposition to Aristotle, maintains the view of dualism. Man is a double being, made up of body and soul, and there is no physical process which corresponds to psychical phenomena. There is no material substrate of sensation, and so we find here no psychophysical theory of memory as with Aristotle. Memory is for Plotinus a purely psychical function. The body does affect memory, however, in a negative way. How the body does this, Plotinus does not make plain. He simply says that, by keeping the body in due subordination, memory receives the negative assistance of not being hindered. The age of Plotinus, as the age of encyclopedic knowledge, of collections and libraries, was the golden age of mnemotechnics. Artificial devices for the assistance of memory are by no means a new invention. Mnemotechnics were probably first devised by one of the Sophists in the age of Socrates. M. Antonius Gripho, who has been identified with the "incertus auctor rhetoricorum ad Herennium," and Cicero, invented mnemotechnic helps to memory, and both had a high opinion of such artificial aid. Quintilian, on the other hand, in the *Institutio Oratoria* expresses disapprobation of all these mnemonic artificialities, on the ground that they in no wise tend to strengthen memory, but rather load it with a double burden. The most important thing to him is the constant exercise of memory, by the committing of passages of literature, and the repetition of what has been learned. In thus training the memory systematically, one trains it effectively, and in this Plutarch and Lucian agree.

W. A. H.

Zu Anaxagoras. EMIL ARLETH. Ar. f. G. d. Ph., VIII, 4, pp. 461–465.

Arleth replies to the objections of Zeller, and explains the misunderstandings in regard to the interpretation of frag. 5 of Anaxagoras. In defence of the view that *λεπτότατον* and *καθαρώτατον* may be predicates of spirit, he cites as an analogous case the statement of Anselm of Canterbury in reference to God, *id quo majus cogitari nequit;* also the distinctions made by Descartes between *vera extensio* and *extensio per analogiam*, the first applying to body, the latter to spirit. Further, in regard to the ambiguity in frag. 5, whether immanence or transcendence is to be ascribed to the divine

Nous, the author asserts that one is not helped by Zeller's explanation (*Ar.*, VIII, p. 151), an analysis of which he takes up in detail.

W. A. H.

Auguste Comte. L. Dugas. Rev. Ph., XX, 9, 225–251; 10, 360–398.

It is almost impossible to make a clear and connected summary of these articles, but the following points may be given. The ideal of Comte, as a young man, was to realize in his life and thought the Greek ideal of harmony, and, according to Dugas, he was always true to this ideal. Positivism denies the existence of absolute truth. All truth is relative to man, 'man' being understood to mean the species and not the individual, so that truth is capable of fixity and universality. The first step towards realizing the ideal of harmony is to establish a universal creed. This agreement of minds is not to be realized in doctrines, but in the acceptation of a common method. Philosophy, after all, is not the possession of, but the search for, truth. It is enough to possess a common method and the necessary principles; the applications one can make for one's self. As soon as the positivist doctrine began to take form, the harmony of the positivists was disturbed. Though willing to accept a common method, all would not accept Comte's application of this method. They separated into two classes, called by Comte, respectively, positivists of the heart, and positivists of the intellect. Positivism must appeal to both intellect and heart, to those who are largely intellectual, and to those who are largely intuitional, women and the poorly educated. In this very appeal to feeling, the source of moral conduct, positivism becomes a practical philosophy. Comte is not satisfied with this harmony and equality of intellect and feeling, but in the second phase or period of his philosophy subordinates intellect to feeling, emphasizing sociology and religion. In this way he seems to make a return to the first of the three stages which he lays down as necessary in the natural development of man, namely, the theological. The religion of Humanity is the end, and positivism is the means for attaining it. Positivism, supposed to be the third stage, in the end thus returns to the first stage. Dugas asserts that, notwithstanding this vicious circle, positivism is always in accord with itself, though he does not explain just how this comes about. The social point of view dominates positivism, which in some measure accounts for this subordination of the intellect to the heart. After formulating this principle, Comte becomes more and more mystical, giving fuller play to his imagination. In the religion of Humanity, humanity becomes *le grand être*, and Mme. de Vaux, as the personification of *le grand être*, the object of adoration. Comte thought and lived for humanity, and should therefore be respected by humanity. He reformed science, only for the ultimate purpose of reforming manners and morals. He is the founder of sociology.

FRANCES C. NEVINS.

The Idea of Nature in Plato. ALFRED BENN. Ar. f. G. d. Ph., IX, 1, pp. 24–49.

Plato's conception of nature as an objective standard of human action is a neglected feature of his philosophy. It represents the influence of the Sophists. There were two schools of Sophists, one following νόμος, the other φύσις. Protagoras represents the former, Hippias the latter. In the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*, Plato accepts the supremacy of law, but tries to harmonise law and nature. The frequent use of the phrases κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν probably indicates a late dialogue. If this be true, then we find a gradual development of naturalistic doctrine, reaching its height in the *Laws*. Here nature is exalted over law, but, as before, there is an attempt to harmonise the two. Plato's communism was probably derived from the Naturalists. Its great development in the *Laws* points to his growing sympathy with the latter.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.